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INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated certain statutory
caps on noneconomic damages in medical cases because they “unduly”2
infringed “upon the inherent power of the judiciary”3 theretofore
recognized (albeit in judicial dictum).4 Such judicial authority originated
within the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.5 The
caps were deemed to “encroach” on the judiciary’s “sphere of authority”6
because they impeded “the courts in the performance of their function.”7
Elsewhere, American state statutory damage caps have also been
challenged on state constitutional separation of powers grounds. These
challenges included setting where the caps operate for nonmedical cases
1. Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. An earlier
draft was presented in November, 2010 at the First Loyola Constitutional Law
Colloquium at the Loyola University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Russ Kazda for
his research help.
2. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Ill. 2010).
3. Id. at 908.
4. Id. at 907.
5. Id. at 914.
6. Id. at 908.
7. Id.
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and where the limits extend beyond noneconomic damages.8
Are there core separation of powers principles guiding all American
state statutory damage caps? If so, do they apply similarly to all types of
cases and all forms of damage caps? With or without such core
principles, are there other doctrines that better speak to damage caps
when conflicts arise between the legislative and judicial branches?
This paper first explores the Illinois precedents on damage caps and
separation of powers. It then explores other state precedents, finding
they usually involve state constitutional allocations of procedural
lawmaking powers. It also finds that caps on “statutory causes of action”
or during “special proceedings” are often treated differently, as are caps
on punitive damages. The paper then posits that separation of powers
analyses should usually be replaced in damage cap cases with judicial
rulemaking analyses. It finds no core principles involving separation of
powers provisions that implicate damage caps. Interstate differences in
constitutional allocations of procedural rulemaking authority (and, at
times, justiciable matters) should be recognized more often in damage
cap settings. These observations have implications beyond damage caps.
Other civil litigation issues prompt tensions between the judicial and
legislative branches, such as evidence privileges. Here, too, separation
of powers analyses should generally not be employed, and often should
be replaced by judicial rulemaking analyses.9

8. Special damage caps often operate when public entities or officials, rather than
private parties, are sued. Here too there can be state constitutional challenges. But
separation of powers (and individual rights) issues differ in public settings because there
are sovereign immunity defenses for certain entities that can be waived, but with
conditions, and official immunity defenses for certain officials, which again can prompt
conditions unseen in private claim settings. This paper will examine only damage caps in
private recovery settings. See, e.g., Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 116 P.3d 295
(Utah 2005) (damage caps in Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to school district,
are valid); Clarke v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 175 P.3d 418 (Or. 2007) (damage cap in
Oregon Tort Claims Act, as applied to acts in public hospital, is valid as to hospital but
invalid, under the state constitutional right to a remedy, as to individual hospital
employees). This paper will not address whether damage caps serve worthy goals. For
such an exploration, see, for example, Andrew F. Popper, Capping Incentives, Capping
Innovation, Courting Disaster: The Gulf Oil Spill and Arbitrary Limits on Civil Liability,
60 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805134
(finding no worthwhile purposes to caps).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d 279, 302-307 (Ky. 2010)
(Abramson, J., dissenting) (reviewing procedural and substantive aspects of evidentiary
privilege laws via a judicial rulemaking analysis); Lear v. Fields, 245 P. 3d 911, 915
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (in assessing a statute altering Supreme Court rule on admissible
expert testimony, reference to both general separation of powers and high court
constitutional procedural rulemaking power).
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DAMAGE CAPS IN ILLINOIS

With Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital,10 the Illinois high court
in 2010 invalidated certain statutory caps on noneconomic damages in
medical cases. The court primarily relied on Best v. Taylor Machine
Works,11 a 1997 opinion where it had invalidated, in part on separation of
powers grounds, statutory caps on noneconomic damages in a broad
array of civil cases, including statutory, common law negligence, and
product liability claims involving “death, bodily injury, or physical
damage to property.”12 As in Best,13 the caps in Lebron were imposed
after determinations by jurors, who were not informed of the caps.14
Thus, in both cases there was said to be “a legislative remittitur” even
though the prevailing plaintiff “objects or does not consent.”15 And in
both cases the caps were deemed to “unduly” encroach upon “the
fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a jury’s
assessment of damages is excessive within the meaning of law.”16
The Lebron court distinguished Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients
Corp.,17 its 2002 decision upholding a statute modifying the common law
rule of joint and several liability by establishing only several liability for
nonmedical damages for any tortfeasor whose percentage of total
attributable fault was less than twenty five percent.18 It deemed the
statute in Unzicker “did not set a cap on damages”19 and did not require a
trial judge to consider entering a judgment “at variance with the jury’s
determination and without regard to the court’s duty to consider, on a
case-by-case basis, whether the jury’s verdict is excessive.”20
The Lebron court also distinguished its own precedents sustaining
certain statutory prohibitions on punitive damages. It reasoned that
punitive damages are “allowed in the interest of society, and not to
recompense solely the individual.”21 As to existing statutes that “limit
10. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 914.
11. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
12. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 903.
13. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081.
14. Id. at 1081; Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 902.
15. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080; Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 908.
16. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2002), cited in
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080, Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 908.
17. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1024, 1029.
18. Id. at 1029.
19. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 910.
20. Id. at 911.
21. Id. at 912. Perhaps analogous is the Illinois high court allowance of a mandatory
criminal sentence upon conviction. Compare People v. Taylor, 464 N.E.2d 1059, 10611063 (Ill. 1984) (stating that mandatory life imprisonment via statute for certain
murderers does not violate separation of powers clause as there is no “invasion of the
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common law liability” by eliminating negligence claims against certain
defendants, like emergency providers of medical services, the Lebron
court declined to comment.22 It did suggest that a statutory cap on
compensatory damages against certain defendants might survive if it
“allows parties to contract around the statutory limit.”23
Long before Best, Unzicker, and Lebron in Illinois, there were
significant tensions involving the shared General Assembly and Supreme
Court duties regarding civil trial practices.24 Illinois constitutional
history from 1818 to 1970 recognizes an increased judicial responsibility
for procedural law.25 Yet the tensions between the branches continued
after the 1970 constitution. The current Illinois Constitution says
nothing explicit about who makes trial practice laws though it expressly
recognizes significant Illinois Supreme Court rulemaking authority over
appellate practices.26 The Supreme Court has, however, long recognized
inherent judicial rulemaking authority for itself on civil trial practices,
which it shares with the General Assembly in limited settings.27
The continuing tensions between legislators and justices are
reflected in written non-constitutional law. The Illinois Civil Procedure
Code says that, other than proceedings regulated by statutes outside the
Code, the Civil Practice Law (Article II of the Code) governs “matters of
procedure” in proceedings covered by Articles III through XIX of the
Code.28 The Code recognizes Supreme Court civil procedure rulemaking
authority, but limits it to rules “supplementary to, but not inconsistent
with” the Code.29 The Code says very little about appellate practices,
which is not surprising given the explicit constitutional high court
authority.30
By contrast, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 1 only says that the rules
and the Civil Practice Law “shall govern all proceedings in the trial
inherent power of the judiciary to impose sentences”) with People v. Davis, 442 N.E.2d
855 (Ill. 1982) (holding that statute requiring court to state its reasons for a criminal case
sentence unduly infringes upon the exercise of a judicial function).
22. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 913.
23. Id. at 913.
24. See, e.g., O’Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1336 (Ill. 1986)
(holding that statutes on voluntary dismissal without prejudice and refiling within one
year could not deprive trial court of Rule 103 power to consider motions seeking
involuntary dismissals with prejudice for failures to secure timely service of process).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness and Bruce Keller, Increased and Accessible Illinois
Judicial Rulemaking,8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 817 (1988).
26. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 6, 9.
27. Parness and Keller, supra note 25.
28. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-108 (2010).
29. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-104(a).
30. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§4, 6, 9.
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court, except to the extent that the procedure in a particular kind of action
is regulated by a statute other than the Civil Practice Law.”31 Rule 1 also
notes that only “rules on appeals shall govern all appeals,”32 presumably
a recognition of the express constitutional high court authority. While
these appellate procedure powers do not expressly exclude matters
involving administrative review,33 other Illinois constitutional provisions
specifically authorize General Assembly lawmaking regarding
administrative review.34
High court deference to civil procedure lawmaking by the Illinois
General Assembly outside the Civil Practice Law seemingly was
recognized in Lebron. There, the court observed that statutory
prohibitions on punitive damages could be sustained. The court recalled
the Best decision where it had acknowledged that “the legislature may
limit certain types of damages, such as damages recoverable in statutory
causes of action.”35
In his dissent in Lebron, Justice Karmeier may have invoked this
deference. He warned that, should the elimination of the noneconomic
damage caps “imperil the availability of medical care,”36 the General
Assembly might then eliminate all noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases or replace such circuit court cases with “a claims
system comparable to . . . workers compensation.”37 While Justice
Karmeier saw no separation of powers or other state constitutional
problems with such initiatives, he again may be in the minority among
the members of the Illinois Supreme Court. Noneconomic damages are
typically compensatory, not punitive.38 Further, it is unclear whether
medical negligence claims may be subject to special statutes in Illinois as
are employer negligence claims,39 now guided, as in most states, by a
workers’ compensation scheme operating outside of constitutional
31. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1.
32. Id.
33. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 6, 9.
34. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (Appellate Court review); Ill. Const. art. VI, § 9 (Circuit
Court review).
35. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d 895, 906 (Ill. 2010).
36. Id. at 933 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 933 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mancari’s Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 948 N.E.2d 233, 236
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (finding conflict between Illinois and Michigan laws “regarding
compensatory damages” as “Illinois does not have a statutory cap on compensatory
damages for noneconomic injuries” while Michigan does).
39. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq. (Workers’ Compensation Act). See, e.g.,
Kolacki v. Verink, 893 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (illustrating the exclusivity of
workers’ compensation remedies under statute); Mier v. Staley, 329 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1975) (upholding Worker’s Compensation Act when challenged on due process,
equal protection, special legislation and right to a remedy grounds).
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Judicial Article courts.40
Special statutory proceedings in Illinois today, where General
Assembly civil procedure lawmaking dominates, include matters that did
not exist, or had no counterpart, in the common law.41 At times they are
deemed sui generis.42 They include marriage dissolution,43 adoption,44
domestic violence protection orders,45 juvenile delinquency,46 postconviction relief47 wrongful death,48 and property tax objection cases.49
Civil procedure lawmaking by the Illinois General Assembly within
and outside the Civil Practice Law should continue after Lebron. As
noted earlier, Rule 1 expressly recognizes the operation of the Civil
Seemingly,
Practice Law in “proceedings in the trial court.”50
notwithstanding the legislative declaration that high court rules should
only supplement, but not conflict with the Civil Procedure Code, rules in
direct conflict with statutes after Lebron should continue to supersede.
40. See, e.g., Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., 216 P.3d 374, 378 (Wash.
2009) (describing medical malpractice claims as “fundamentally negligence claims,
rooted in the common law tradition,” that claims can only constitute “special
proceedings” where “the legislature has exercised its police power and entirely changed
the remedies available (such as the workers’ compensation system)”); Governale v.
Lieberman, 250 P.3d 220, 224 (Az. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that as medical malpractice
claims originate in the common law, they cannot be abrogated by the legislature under
Art. 18, § 6 of the state constitution providing that damage recovery amounts “shall not
be subject to any statutory limitation”).
41. See, e.g., Strukoff v. Strukoff, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1171-72 (Ill. 1979) (describing
that proceedings entirely statutory in origin and nature originate in equity, where powers
depended largely upon statutory grants).
42. See, e.g., People v. Clements, 230 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ill. 1967) (holding that
proceedings under Post-Conviction Hearing Act are “civil in nature” and “sui generis,” so
Civil Practice Act often does not apply).
43. See, e.g., Strukoff, 389 N.E.2d at 1170 (holding that bifurcated hearing mandated
by Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act did not infringe upon judicial
authority because divorce proceedings are wholly statutory in origin).
44. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Scraggs, 532 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. 1988) (holding
that the Adoption Act procedures apply though in conflict with Civil Practice Law and
Supreme Court Rules).
45. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201.
46. See, e.g., People v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700, 705-07 (Ill. 1991) (describing that
there is “neither a common law nor a constitutional right to adjudication” of wrongs by a
juvenile in a delinquency proceeding); In re S.G., 677 N.E.2d 920, 929 (Ill. 1997).
47. See, e.g., People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1988) (holding
that civil discovery rules inapplicable in proceedings under Post-Conviction Hearing
Act).
48. See, e.g., Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 847-50 (Kan. 1989) (finding no cause
of action at common law for wrongful death and sustaining a Kansas cap on
nonpecuniary loss comparable to the statutory caps in Illinois and New Hampshire).
49. See, e.g., Madison Two Assoc. v. Pappas, 884 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ill. 2008)
(explaining that in circuit courts, property tax objection complaints are chiefly governed
by Property Tax Code).
50. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1.
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Illinois precedents demand this result, as perhaps does the high court’s
constitutionally recognized “general administrative and supervisory
authority over all courts.”51
Illinois precedents also indicate that even where statutes do not
directly conflict with rules, they may still fall. Areas of nearly (if not
absolutely) exclusive high court procedural lawmaking authority include
not only appellate procedures outside administrative review, but also the
admission, regulation, and discipline of lawyers.52 Exceptions appear,
though line drawing is difficult. Thus, a statute limiting contingency fees
in medical malpractice cases was sustained in 1986 when challenged on
separation of powers grounds because it permitted judges to allow fees
beyond the statutory limits when “fairness” dictates.53 More absolute
recovery caps on attorney fees may also survive separation of powers
scrutiny in special statutory settings such as worker’s compensation.
After Lebron, other major constraints on civil procedure lawmaking
by the Illinois General Assembly remain which could also invalidate
statutory damage caps. One significant limit, raised but not addressed in
Lebron, is the constitutional right to a trial by jury.54 State jury trial
rights elsewhere have served to invalidate statutory damage caps.55
Another limit involves the Illinois constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.56 The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down as irrational a
state statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases not involving wrongful death on state constitutional equal
protection grounds.57 Additional Illinois constitutional limits, raised but
51. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602 (Ill.
1977) (describing a court rule on how judges, not lawyers, voir dire prospective jurors
“was a product of this court’s supervisory and administrative responsibility, another
reason the legislature was without authority to determine how a voir dire examination of
prospective jurors should be conducted,” so that a statute allowing attorney voir dire
questioning was unconstitutional).
52. See generally Parness and Keller, supra note 25. Cases include People ex rel.
Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ill. 1988) (recognizing judiciary’s “inherent and
exclusive power to regulate the practice of law”).
53. Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. 1986) (construing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1114 and observing that “whether the provision would fail if it did not contain the
allowance for larger fees is not before us”).
54. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13, noted in Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 900.
55. See, e.g., Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.
2010) (holding that a statute limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases
violated state constitutional right to trial by jury).
56. Ill. Const. art. I, § 2, noted in Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 900.
57. Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005).
Compare Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 51 So.3d 874 (La. App. 3d 2010) (holding that a
general damage cap on medical malpractice claims against nurse practitioners violated
state equal protection rights), with DRD Pool Service, Inc. v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45 (Md.
2010) (holding that a statutory cap on noneconomic damages, in cases involving personal
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unaddressed in Lebron, include special legislation laws,58 due process,59
and the right to a certain and complete remedy.60
Whether the General Assembly employs tort reform, healthcare
crisis, or other substantive law phrases, statutes altering Illinois civil trial
practices should continue to prompt Illinois constitutional analyses
involving both allocation of governmental authority and individual
rights. While unclear at times, the reaches of civil procedure lawmaking
by the General Assembly will be assessed after Lebron, much as before,
with special judicial scrutiny of statutes limiting jury decision making.
After Lebron, judicial resolutions of state constitutional challenges
to new Illinois civil practice statutes, including new statutory damage
caps, should eschew general separation of powers analyses for particular
judicial rulemaking analyses. The Illinois constitutional dimensions of
the “inherent power of the judiciary”61 should only be assessed upon
consideration of judicial rulemaking authority, whether recognized
specially in the constitution itself, as with appellate practices, or in
precedents.62 Further, particular judicial rulemaking analyses should
only be undertaken after individual constitutional rights, as jury trial, are
fully considered. Such rights limit both legislative and judicial
lawmaking. Findings of individual rights infringements, such as
violations of the right to trial by jury, within statutes or court rules will
injury or wrongful death, does not violate state constitutional equal protection).
58. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (used in Best, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1069 (Ill. 1997)), noted
in Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 900 (Ill. 2010).
59. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2, noted in Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 900. Besides state
constitutional due process issues, for statutory damage caps there may also be federal
constitutional due process issues. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978) (“The remaining due process objection to the
liability-limitation provision is that it fails to provide those injured by a nuclear accident
with a satisfactory quid pro quo for the common law rights of recovery which the Act
abrogates. Initially, it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law
or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. However, we need not resolve this question
here since the Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reasonably just substitute
for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces.”); Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from dismissal “for want
of a substantial federal question” and stating that the issue left open in Duke Power Co. is
“one dividing the appellate and highest courts of several States”).
60. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12, noted in Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 900. While in Lebron,
many constitutional issues were avoided due to the separation of powers analysis in Best,
the court in Best resolved the separation of powers issue even though it could have been
avoided since the statute in Best also fell on special legislation grounds. Best v. Taylor
Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1059 (1997).
61. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 914.
62. See, e.g., People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 901-02 (Ill. 1988)
(holding that as to attorney misconduct, high court has “sole” authority, arising from
“inherent power” and thus its rulemaking is “exclusive”).
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avoid the need to resolve conflicts about the proper allocations of
procedural lawmaking.
Unfortunately, outside of Illinois, state constitutional separation of
powers analyses of statutory damage caps also often overlook the import
of constitutional judicial rulemaking. There too, rulemaking and
individual right analyses should be preferred over generalized separation
of powers analyses.
III. DAMAGE CAPS OUTSIDE ILLINOIS
Damage cap cases outside Illinois are sometimes resolved with only
generalized references to separation of powers, accompanied by little or
no analyses of relevant judicial rulemaking authority.63 As in Illinois,
damage caps elsewhere are assessed differently for common law and
other civil claims, suggesting jury trial rights—not governmental
structure—are key. As with the federal constitution, state constitutions
typically recognize jury trial rights only for common law actions.
Finally, the legitimacy of statutory caps varies elsewhere, as in Lebron,
for compensatory and punitive awards.
A.

General Separation of Powers Analyses

A generalized separation of powers analysis was employed by the
Nebraska high court64 in 2003 to sustain a provision in the state’s
Hospital-Medical Liability Act that limited recoverable damages in
medical malpractice actions to $1,250,000.65 There, the court simply
summarized very briefly other state precedents on separation of powers
barriers to caps under their own state constitutions.66 The Nebraska court
did not review the varying constitutional separation of powers clauses, or
other relevant clauses, including those addressing civil practice
lawmaking.67 The court also did not describe the types of claims or
damages at issue in the other state cases.
63. Federal courts hearing state constitutional separation of powers challenges to
state damage caps may refer those challenges to the state courts. See, e.g., Estate of
McCall ex rel. McCall v. U.S., 642 F.3d 944, 952 (11th Cir. 2011) (referring challenge to
Florida statutory cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages to the Florida
Supreme Court).
64. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003).
65. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (2010).
66. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 76-77.
67. An even simpler analysis of separation of powers appears in Estate of McCall v.
U.S., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1306-07 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (upholding Florida statute capping
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2008), when
challenged, inter alia, on separation of powers grounds), followed in M.D. v. U.S., 745 F.
Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
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The Nebraska court specifically rejected the Illinois court’s outcome
in the Best case, the opinion utilized in Lebron.68 It also expressly
rejected Washington Supreme Court dicta that damage caps might
violate separation of powers.69 That dicta was pronounced in 1989 in a
case involving a statutory cap on noneconomic damages that was tied to
a multiplier involving “average annual wage” and “life expectancy” in
“personal injury or death” cases.70 There, the Washington court simply
said that a damages cap would violate the Washington separation of
powers doctrine if it mandated a “legal conclusion.”71 The court hinted
that a statutory limit on damages would be such a conclusion as it would
constitute an improper attempt to deem jury damage findings
“unsupported by the evidence.”72 The court also said that the legislature
was unable to make “such case-by-case determinations.”73
In 1989, the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed its own state statute
limiting total recoverable damages for malpractice claims against health
care providers.74 This court actually referenced particular constitutional
provisions beyond separation of powers in sustaining the law, including
provisions allowing the General Assembly to determine trial court
jurisdiction75 and to alter the common law at the time the Constitution
took effect.76
Ten years later, the Virginia high court again validated the same
damage cap, chiefly relying on the 1989 precedent.77 This time,
however, the court also spoke of judicial rulemaking authority on civil
practice matters as the plaintiff had urged that the cap violated the
constitutional provision authorizing the high court to establish “rules
68. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 76.
69. Id. (referencing Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989), amended
by, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989)).
70. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 713 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250(2) (West
1986)).
71. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Tacoma v. O’Brien, 534 P.2d 114 (Wash. 1975)). In Tacoma, the
court declared unconstitutional an act allowing for government contracts to be cancelled
due to “economic impossibility,” reasoning this necessarily involved a judicial
determination that could not be made by the legislature. Tacoma, 534 P.2d at 116.
74. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
75. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 532 (citing VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (West)). The court
added that a damages cap could be seen as “establishing the jurisdiction of the courts in
specific cases.” Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 532.
76. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 532 (citing VA. CONST. art. XII, § 3). The court noted
that a damages cap statute may simply be a common law modification. Etheridge, 376
S.E.2d at 532.
77. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999)
(examining VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.25 (West 2011)).
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governing . . . the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the
Commonwealth.”78 The court found dispositive that under the same
provision, any such rules “shall not be in conflict with the general law as
the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General
Assembly.”79
In 2002, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld80 as facially valid
statutes capping noneconomic damages in tort actions for personal injury
and wrongful death81 and limiting punitive damages, with half of such
limited damages going to the state treasury.82 The plurality opinion
found no separation of powers violation, simply siding with other state
courts recognizing that the General Assembly power “to modify or
abolish the common law . . . includes the power to set reasonable limits
on recoverable damages” in claims recognized by the Assembly.83 The
plurality also referenced only generally the Alaska constitutional
provision on “the separation of governmental powers.”84
Similarly, in 2004 the Utah Supreme Court upheld, in a separation
of powers challenge, a statute limiting noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice actions.85 The court found that there was “a legitimate and
long-established role for legislative involvement in jury trials,” including
statutes on “standards of proof, elements of torts and crimes, and . . .
much of the law upon which jury instructions are based.”86 Here too,
reference was only made to “the separation of powers provision” of the
state constitution.87 There was no mention of a statute recognizing the
primary authority of the Utah high court in civil procedure lawmaking.88
78. Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 319 (citing VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5).
79. Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 319 (citing VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5). The court also cited
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3, a provision recognizing the General Assembly’s power to
“modify or annul” any high court rules. Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 319.
80. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (plurality opinion)
(citing ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 09.17.010, 09.17.020(f), (h), (j) (West 2011)). Caps define
eligible noneconomic losses and are guided by absolute amounts and multipliers.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010.
81. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010 (describing that caps define eligible
noneconomic losses and are guided by absolute amounts, multipliers, and whether the
defendant is an employee charged with an unlawful employment practice).
82. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.020(f)-(h) and (j).
83. Evans, 56 P.3d at 1055-56.
84. Id. at 1055 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 (West)).
85. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1
(West 1953) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West 2008)).
86. Id. at 145.
87. Id. (citing UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1).
88. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-103(1) (West 2008) (providing that the “Supreme
Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence,” though amendments by the
legislature are allowed upon a two-third vote of “all members of both houses”).
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By contrast, judicial rulemaking authority was referenced in a 2002
Michigan Court of Appeals case involving a separation of powers
challenge to a state statute limiting noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice claims.89 The court cited the state constitutional provision
on Supreme Court procedural rulemaking.90 The court then found the
statute to “reflect legislative policy considerations other than court
practice and procedure.”91
B.

Common Law and Other Civil Actions

In Lebron, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that “the
legislature may limit certain types of damages, such as damages
recoverable in statutory causes of action.”92 The majority did not
elaborate on what distinguishes statutory (or other) claims where damage
caps can be sustained.93 In his separate opinion, however, Justice
Karmeier opined that the General Assembly could eliminate all
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases,94 a questionable
proposition given their compensatory nature, their resolution in Judicial
Article courts, and the state constitutional right to jury trial on common
law claims.95 Justice Karmeier also notes that medical malpractice cases
could be replaced with “a claims system comparable to . . . workers
compensation.”96 Here, economic and noneconomic damages might be
capped, if not dramatically altered. Outside of Illinois, separation of
powers principles have been more significantly analyzed when
challenges to damage caps have been considered regarding both
“statutory causes” and alternative claims systems, as now described.
1.

Statutory Causes of Action

In 2009, the Washington Supreme Court explored which civil
89. Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1994)).
90. Id. at 739 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 5).
91. Id. at 739.
92. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 906 (Ill. 2010). By contrast,
statutory limits on attorney fee recoveries may be comparably assessed in settings
involving representations of both common law and statutory causes of action, as the high
court claims exclusive authority over lawyer conduct. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d
763, 778-79 (Ill. 1986).
93. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 906.
94. Id. at 933 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate.”).
96. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 933 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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actions are “special proceedings” and thus bound to statutory pleading
procedures in conflict with high court rules.97 In Washington, as in
Illinois, a court rule states that high court rules govern civil proceedings
“except where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special
proceedings.”98 Recognizing that high court rules did not necessarily
control “special proceedings” and that the court otherwise had not “set
out a rule for determining whether a proceeding is ordinary or special,”99
Washington courts have “identified certain actions as special
proceedings, including lien foreclosures, sexually violent predator
petitions, garnishment, will contests, and unlawful detention actions.”100
The court described special actions as not including all statutes
regulating civil claim procedures, but rather all procedural statutes
addressing “actions unknown to common law (such as attachment,
mandamus, or certiorari).”101 As for common law actions, special
proceedings come into play when legislation “entirely” changes the
“remedies available,” such as in workers’ compensation.102
As to the basis for the high court’s primary authority over civil
practices in common law cases, the court simply referenced the
“presumed” separation of powers, which embodies the “fundamental”
function of the judicial branch “to promulgate rules” involving court
practices.103
For common law actions, the Washington court did recognize room
for some procedural statutes. As to the special medical malpractice
pleading statute before it, the court explored whether it conflicted with
high court rules and, if so, whether it was a procedural law.104 As to
conflicts, the court noted its disposition to “attempt to harmonize”
arguably conflicting rules and statutes so as to be able to “give effect to
both.”105 When conflicts are found, rules govern as long as statutes
impacting civil procedure in common law actions are not
“substantive.”106 In recognizing a secondary role for the General
97.
98.

Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., 216 P.3d 374, 377-78 (Wash. 2009).
Scheib v. Crosby, 249 P.3d 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (reviewing WASH.
SUPER. CT. R. 81). “Special proceedings” are defined by case law. Id., 249 P.3d at 187.
99. Putnam, 216 P.3d at 377.
100. Id. at 377-78. See also Scheib, 249 P.3d at 187 (noting that special proceedings
include actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN
§§ 34.05.001-.903 (West 2011)).
101. Putnam, 216 P.3d at 378. Special statutory proceedings are occasionally spelled
out expressly in court rules. See, e.g., N.D. R. CIV. P. 81(a) and accompanying Table A.
102. Putnam, 216 P.3d at 378.
103. Id. at 377.
104. Id. at 377-80.
105. Id. at 379.
106. See id. (noting that substantive statutes “address the primary rights of either
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Assembly in civil procedure lawmaking guiding common law actions in
Judicial Article courts, the Washington court did not examine any
explicit state constitutional provisions on high court rulemaking. In fact,
there are none.107
The same approach to an alleged conflict between statute and court
rule was followed a year later when another statutory medical
malpractice procedure fell.108 However, here the conflict was not so
apparent.109 The statute required claimants to provide notice to
prospective defendants at least ninety days before commencing suits.110
The statute was found to be procedural and to conflict with a court rule,
which declared that suits are commenced by the service of summons and
a complaint or by the filing of a complaint.111 Again, there was a
reliance on inferred state constitutional separation of powers, including
an inherent high court power to promulgate procedural rules.112
2.

Alternative and Exclusive Claims Systems

In his Lebron dissent, Justice Karmeier suggested that the Illinois
General Assembly could eliminate all noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases by replacing civil actions with “a claims system
comparable to . . . workers compensation.”113 The majority said little
about the availability of this vehicle for statutory damage caps applicable
to medical malpractice (or other) claims now heard by Judicial Article
party” and not “the procedures to effectuate those rights”).
107. The Washington Constitution is silent on high court procedural lawmaking. But
see WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (providing that the “legislature shall prescribe by law the
jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in
pursuance of the Constitution”), and WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (providing that “superior
courts and district courts . . . shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in
justices’ and other inferior courts . . . as may be prescribed by law”). See also WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 2.04.190-.200 (West 2004) (recognizing high court procedural rulemaking
powers, with those rules overriding conflicting statutes); O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 458
P.2d 154 (Wash. 1969) (both record and nonrecord courts have inherent authority to
waive payment of statutory filing fees).
108. See Waples v. Yi, 234 P.3d 187 (Wash. 2010).
109. Id. at 193 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (finding no irreconcilable conflict as harmony
between statute and rule was demanded).
110. Id. at 188 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100(1)).
111. Waples, 234 P.3d at 191 (citing WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 3(a)).
112. Waples, 234 P.3d at 190.
113. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 933 (Ill. 2010) (Karmeier, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Karmeier did not suggest replacement
of trial court actions with laws mandating binding arbitration which exist at times in
Illinois and elsewhere for certain insurance claims. See, e.g., Reed v. Farmers Ins. Grp.,
720 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. 1999) (reviewing other state insurance dispute arbitration schemes
while sustaining Illinois laws compelling binding arbitration of certain uninsured motorist
coverage claims).
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courts, including their juries,114 although it did hint that such an
alternative claims system would need to require “all stakeholders to
make a sacrifice,” something not mandated in the Act then under
review.115
The possibility of alternative claim systems that eliminate or alter
common law remedies, beyond workers compensation, is recognized
elsewhere. For example, in 1955 the Texas Supreme Court declared:
Legislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well
established common-law causes of action for injuries to one’s “lands,
goods, person or reputation” is sustained only when it is reasonable in
substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable exercise of the
police power in the interest of the general welfare. Legislative action
116
of this type is not sustained when it is arbitrary or unreasonable.

And in 1989, the California Supreme Court observed the following
while sustaining a local agency’s power to adjudicate excess rent claims:
We too will carefully apply the “reasonable necessity/legitimate
regulatory purpose” requirements in order to guard against unjustified
delegation of authority to decide disputes that otherwise belong in the
courts. Specifically, we will inquire whether the challenged remedial
power is authorized by legislation, and reasonably necessary to
accomplish the administrative agency’s regulatory purposes.
Furthermore, we will closely scrutinize the agency’s asserted

114. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 895. The Illinois Supreme Court has left the door
open to special, pretrial settlement-facilitation procedures for pending medical
malpractice cases. See, e.g., Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 74041 (Ill. 1976) (finding a specific statutory medical review panel requirement to be
unconstitutional because it improperly vests inherent judicial power in non-judges and
impermissibly restricts jury trial rights, while adding that “we do not imply that a valid
pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised”).
115. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 909. An alternative state compensation scheme would be
assessed differently if its creation was expressly invited (or required) by the state
constitution. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 32 (workers’ compensation); LA. CONST. art.
V, § 16 (workers’ compensation). In Louisiana, express state constitutional authority was
needed to overcome otherwise germane state constitutional limits on statutory
infringements of judicial authority. See Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990). An
alternative scheme need not cover all injuries. See, e.g., Saab v. Mass. CVS Pharmacy,
LLC, 896 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. 2007) (holding that the Workers’ Compensation Act, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 1-86 (West 2008) can bar wrongful death claims against an
employer by the parents of a deceased employee, as the Act need not support all remedies
sought by injured workers or their families).
116. Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex. 1955) (construing the
Texas constitutional Open Courts provision). Lebohm has precedential value. See, e.g.,
Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 285-86, 28890 (Tex. 2010) (finding that ten-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions
does not violate Open Courts provision).
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regulatory purposes in order to ascertain whether the challenged
remedial power is merely incidental to a proper, primary regulatory
purpose, or whether it is in reality an attempt to transfer
determination of traditional common law claims from the courts to a
specialized agency whose primary purpose is the processing of such
117
claims.

Such alternative claims systems operate on occasion.118 For
example, Virginia has had the Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Program since 1988, wherein the Workers’ Compensation Commission
has jurisdiction over individual claims involving birth-related disabilities
caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury.119 Such a scheme
raises far fewer separation of powers, and other constitutional issues,
when it is optional rather than exclusive.120
Alternative claims systems wherein damages are capped seemingly
would not prompt judicial rulemaking analyses.
But here too,
generalized separation of powers analyses also are misplaced. Rather,
constitutional assessments beyond individual rights (equal protection or
due process, for example) should focus on the propriety of jurisdictionstripping,121 especially where the state constitution itself establishes the
trial courts of general jurisdiction and vests in those courts all justiciable
matters.122 Of course, state constitutional issues are dramatically reduced
117. McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 108 (Cal. 1989).
118. In some settings an alternative claims system cannot wholly deprive a common
law claimant of the chance to go to court. See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging,
Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 442-3 (Ariz. 2003) (finding that under Article 18, § 6 of the Arizona
Constitution—the anti-abrogation clause—the legislature may not “regulate” a right of
action so greatly as to effectively deprive a claimant of the power to bring that action).
119. For a discussion of Virginia’s Birth-Related Neurological Injury Program and its
lack of a damage cap, see Kathleen M. McCauley, Damages for Medical Malpractice in
Virginia, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 919, 933-35 (1999). The Florida no-fault administrative
scheme for birth-related neurological injury claims due to oxygen deprivation or
mechanical failure is described in Bennett v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 36 FLA. L.
WEEKLY S336 (Fla. 2011).
120. See, e.g., Konig v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 50 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2002)
(deciding that the Commission’s award of emotional distress damages to housing
discrimination claimants did not violate the state constitution’s judicial powers clause
because there was a “judicial option”).
121. McHugh, 777 P.2d at 93, 112-16 (focusing on both judicial power and jury trial
limits in assessing delegation of private disputes to administrative agencies).
122. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 9. For a state constitutional law analysis
concluding that a health court scheme outside Judicial Article Courts could withstand
challenge, see Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative
Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 59 (2008) (considering potential equal protection, due process, separation of
powers, jury trial and access to courts arguments). President Obama’s federal budget
proposals in 2011 included possible federal funding for states establishing health courts
to decide medical malpractice cases. Sylvia Hsieh, Are Health Courts Coming to a State
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when state constitutions explicitly recognize legislative authority to
establish alternative claims schemes.123
C.

Compensatory and Punitive Damages

In Lebron, the Illinois Supreme Court seemingly removed punitive
damage caps from its separation of powers barrier outside of “statutory
causes of action.”124 The court reasoned that punitive damages are
“allowed in the interest of society, and not to recompense solely the
individual.”125 This rationale could serve to permit punitive damage caps
elsewhere, especially where there are comparable state court approaches
to the separation of powers and judicial rulemaking.
In Kentucky, there is a different approach and a different outcome,
at least for now. In 2010, the Court of Appeals deemed unconstitutional
the Dram Shop Act’s ban on all damage awards, including punitive
damage awards, against alcohol licensees and their agents.126 Besides
finding “a violation of the jural rights” doctrine,127 the court relied on the
separation of powers generally, and specifically on the Act’s intrusion
“upon the fact-finding role of the courts in violation of Sections 27, 28
and 109 of the Kentucky constitution,” though these sections were
neither quoted nor analyzed in much depth.128 The court’s ruling was
Near You?, LAWYERS USA, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://lawyersusaonline.com/
blog/2011/02/25/are-health-courts-coming-to-a-state-near-you
123. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10, 16 (granting courts jurisdiction over workers’
compensation).
124. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). In fact, Illinois
law provides that there are no punitive damages in medical malpractice cases. 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115 (2010).
125. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912.
126. Taylor v. King, No. 2009-CA-001599-MR., 2010 WL 3810797, at *6 (Ky. Ct.
App. Oct. 1, 2010) (invalidating the ban in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.241 (West 2010)
while not ruling on other aspects of the Act, including the “standard for imposing liability
upon a dram shop” or the “creation of a priority of liability between the dram shop and
the intoxicated tortfeasor”).
127. Taylor, 2010 WL 3810797, at *4. The jural rights doctrine flows from KY.
CONST. §§ 14, 54, 241 and essentially holds that “the General Assembly has no authority
to abolish or restrict a common law right of recovery for personal injury or wrongful
death.” Taylor, 2010 WL 3810797, at *4. KY. CONST. § 14 provides for open courts and
a remedy for injuries. KY. CONST. § 54 says that the General Assembly has no power to
limit recoveries for death or for personal or property injuries. KY CONST. § 241
recognizes certain General Assembly authority over the bringing of civil claims involving
death.
128. Taylor, 2010 WL 3810797, at *5-6. KY. CONST. § 27 says that the powers of
Kentucky government are divided “into three distinct departments,” with each
department “confined to a separate body of magistracy.” KY. CONST. § 28 says that no
person in one governmental department “shall exercise any power properly belonging” to
another department except as “expressly directed or permitted.” KY. CONST. § 109 says
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grounded on the view that “fact-finding” on the causation of the personal
injuries to a claimant involves “a factual matter entrusted to the judicial
branch, and in particular the finder of fact in a judicial proceeding.”129
Outside of Kentucky, there are absolute dollar caps on punitive
damages.130 Punitive damages are sometimes capped at amounts
correlated to the compensatory damages.131
IV. CONCLUSION
General state separation of powers principles should play no part in
assessments of state statutory damage caps, neither in or outside of
medical cases nor in or outside of noneconomic losses. There are no
core separation of powers principles guiding all state statutory damage
caps. Instead, as has been done by some courts, damage caps should
more frequently be examined for infringement on judicial rulemaking
authority. Such examinations should distinguish between caps in
statutory and common law actions, caps operative in alternative and
exclusive claims systems, and caps on compensatory and punitive
damages.

that the “judicial power . . . shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice” divided
into a Supreme Court, Appeals Courts, Circuit Courts and District Courts.
129. Taylor, 2010 WL 3810797, at *5.
130. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 ($350,000 in medical malpractice actions)
(West 2010).
131. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(4) (West 2009) (allowing punitive
damages no greater than twice the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000.00,
whichever is greater); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2006) (capping punitive
damages at five times the defendant’s compensatory damage liability or $350,000.00,
whichever is greater).

